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For  many  years  deposit  insurance  was  one  of  the 
few  instances  of  government  intervention  in  the 
economy  that  just  about  everybody-liberals  and 
conservatives  alike-agreed  was  a good  idea.  Since 
there  was not  much  debate  about  deposit  insurance, 
there  was  little  discussion  of  it. 
The  savings  and  loan  crisis  has  changed  all this. 
No  one  believes  that  deposit  insurance  was the  only 
cause  of  the  crisis,  and  probably  only  a minority  of 
those  who  have  studied  the  crisis  think  it  was  the 
principal  cause.  Nonetheless,  there  is  now 
widespread  agreement  among  those  in the  best  posi- 
tion  to  judge  that  deposit  insurance  has  at  least 
contributed  to  the  thrift  problem. 
Deposit  insurance  is now  getting  a great  deal  of 
attention.  The  FIRREA  (Financial  Institutions 
Reform,  Recovery,  and  Enforcement  Act  of  1989) 
law requires  the  Treasury  Department  to  prepare  a 
study  of  deposit  insurance;  the  American  Bankers 
Association  has  already  published  a  proposal  for 
reforming  the  deposit  insurance  system;  and  leading 
newspapers  and  financial  periodicals  currently  are 




How  did  deposit  insurance  contribute  to  the  thrift 
crisis  and  what  risks  does  deposit  insurance  pose  for 
the  commercial  banking  industry  in the  future?  The 
response  to  this  question  is that  deposit  insurance 
presents  a  “moral  hazard”  to  banks  and  other 
depository  institutions.  Moral  hazard,  as applied  to 
deposit  insurance,  means  that  the  managers  of a thrift 
or  a bank  may  have  an  incentive  to  acquire  riskier 
assets  than  they  should  because  insured  depositors- 
secure  in the  knowledge  that  their  funds  are  safe  in 
any  event-will  not  penalize  the  institution  by 
withdrawing  their  funds  or  requiring  that  a  risk 
premium  be  added  to the  rates  paid  on their  deposits. 
The  hazard  is  all  the  greater  if,  as  in  too  many 
institutions  at present,  capital  is relatively  low so that 
shareholders-who  often  include  managers-have 
only  a modest  amount  of their  wealth  at stake  in the 
institution.  It seems  clear  in retrospect  that  the  moral 
hazard  associated  with  deposit  insurance  did  in fact 
play  a role  in  the  thrift  crisis,  although  it  may  not 
have  been  the  initial  cause  of the  crisis.  Specifically, 
at least  some  thrifts  invested  the  deposits  entrusted 
to them  in highly  risky ventures  that  depositors  would 
not  have  tolerated  in the  absence  of insurance.  With 
this  unfortunate  experience  in  mind,  commercial 
bankers  obviously  need  to be  aware  of the  long-term 
risks  that  deposit  insurance  presents  to  the  banking 
industry  so that  they  can  work  with  the  appropriate 
regulators  to  evaluate  and  avoid  these  risks. 
Attention  must  also  be  given  to  the  problems 
deposit  insurance  may  cause  in  the  U.S.  economy 
as a whole  as well  as in particular  depository  institu- 
tions  and  industries.  Risk  may  be  systematically 
underpriced  in  the  U.S.  economy  because  deposit 
insurance  reduces  the  risk  premium  depository 
institutions  have  to  pay  when  they  compete  for 
deposits.  Loan  rates  may  therefore  not  reflect  ade- 
quately  the  risk  associated  with  particular  loans.  If 
this  is true,  too  many  economic  resources  are  being 
drawn  to relatively  high  risk ventures  and  away from 
lower-yielding  but  economically  more  defensible  proj- 
ects.  The  apparent  excess  supply  of office  buildings 
and  condominiums  in many  parts  of the  country  cur- 
rently  suggests  that  there  may  have  been  a signifi- 
cant  misallocation  of capital  in the  United  States  over 
the  last  decade.  Deposit  insurance  may  have  con- 
tributed  to  this  misallocation.  If  this  conjecture  is 
accurate,  it is essential  to correct  the  problem  quickly 
since  America  must  allocate  its  capital  resources  as 
productively  as possible  to strengthen  its competitive- 
ness  in  today’s  highly  efficient  world  markets. 
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WAYS  To  DEALWITHTHE~ROBLEM 
The  key  question,  obviously,  is:  how  should  we 
reform  the  deposit  insurance  system?  The  recom- 
mendations  that  follow are not  necessarily  the  views 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  as  a  whole  although  many 
of them  are  held  widely  in  the  System.  Many  also 
correspond  to points  Chairman  Greenspan  made  in 
his  testimony  on  deposit  insurance  reform  on  July 
12,  1990,  before  the  Senate  Committee  on  Bank- 
ing,  Housing,  and  Urban  Affairs. 
Before  considering  what  reforms  should  be  made 
it should  be recognized  that  whatever  problems  may 
be  associated  with  deposit  insurance,  it  has  pro- 
duced  significant  benefits  since  its inception  back  in 
the  1930s.  In particular,  no systemic  runs  on federally 
insured  institutions  have  occurred  during  this period. 
Every  effort  must  be  made  to preserve  this  benefit. 
The  old adage  about  not  throwing  the  baby  out with 
the  bathwater  seems  especially  appropriate  in  the 
context  of deposit  insurance  reform.  Moreover,  any 
attempt  to  overhaul  overnight  a system  as  popular 
and  extensive  as deposit  insurance  would  be  unwise. 
A better  approach  would  be  to set  strategic  goals  for 
reform  of the  system  and  then  develop  a long-range, 
phased  plan  to  achieve  these  objectives  with 
minimum  disruption.  The  following  recommenda- 
tions  are  in  this  spirit. 
Accelerating  and Improving 
Resolution  Procedures 
In dealing  with  the  deposit  insurance  problem,  the 
most  urgent  need  is to  accelerate  the  resolution  of 
what  are euphemistically  called “capital-impaired”  in- 
stitutions:  in plain  English,  insolvent  or soon-to-be- 
insolvent  institutions.  This  is the  only  sure  way  to 
protect  the  deposit  insurance  funds  and  prevent  or 
at  least  limit  further  potential  losses  to  taxpayers. 
Taxpayers  are angry  about  their  potential  losses  from 
the  thrift  crisis  to  date.  They  have  no  stomach  for 
any  further  losses. 
Accelerating  the  resolution  process  and protecting 
the  insurance  funds,  of course,  are  easier  said  than 
done.  One  intriguing  proposal  for accomplishing  this 
is  the  American  Bankers  Association’s  “final 
settlement  payment”  procedure  put  forward  in March 
of  1990.  Under  this  procedure,  an  insured  institu- 
tion  would  go  into  FDIC  receivership  immediately 
upon  a determination  that  it was  insolvent.  On  the 
next  business  day  the  FDIC  would  give  insured 
depositors  access  to their  full balances  up to $100,000 
and  settle  the  claims  of  uninsured  depositors  and 
unsecured  creditors  through  a “final settlement  pay- 
ment,?  the  amount  of which  would  be set  so that  the 
FDIC  would  break  even  over  time  in  its  receiver- 
ship  activities.  According  to  the  ABA  this  amount 
would  be  between  85  and  95  percent  of uninsured 
and  unsecured  creditor  claims.  This  plan  is appeal- 
ing because  it would  subject  depository  institutions 
to a greater  degree  of healthy  market  discipline  than 
exists  currently  while  at the  same  time  giving  unin- 
sured  depositors  and unsecured  creditors  immediate 
access  to  most  of  their  funds.  It  would  also  help 
neutralize  the  “too-big-to-fail”  problem  if  it  were 
applied)consistently  and  therefore  were  a credible, 
permanent  policy  known  in advance  by  depositors, 
bondholders,  and other  creditors.  There  may be legal 
or technical  problems  with  this  approach  which  have 
not  surfaced  yet,  but,  apart  from  this  possibility,  the 
ABA’s  proposal  seems  to  have  considerable  merit. 
Any  proposal  that  holds  out  a  hope  of  halting  the 
erosion  of  the  insurance  funds  deserves  serious 
consideration. 
One  particularly  sticky  problem  involved  in 
accelerating  the  resolution  of  insolvent  institutions 
deserves  mention-the  question  of what  accounting 
system  should  be  used  in  determining  insolvency. 
It is well  known  that  conventional  accounting  prac- 
tices  based  on  historical  book  values  do  not  always 
accurately  reflect  the  true  current  condition  of an in- 
stitution.  Consequently,  some  economists  and others 
have  urged  the  adoption  of market  value  accounting 
in  some  form.  There  are  a  lot  of  knotty  practical 
problems  involved  in  switching  to  market  value 
accounting,  and  the  solutions  to  all these  problems 
are not  clear yet.  Changes  along these  lines may have 
to be considered,  however,  since  it will not  be possi- 
ble to improve  resolution  procedures  unless  accurate 
and  timely  information  on  the  true  condition  of in- 
sured  institutions  is available.  If a way  can  be  found 
to develop  this  information,  it would  then  be  incum- 
bent,on  the  supervisory  agencies  to review  it at least 
annually  for  each  insured  bank  in  a  full  in-bank 
examination. 
Finally,  whatever  specific  procedures  are adopted 
for  resolving  insolvencies,  it  is  important  that  the 
Federal  Reserve  reinforce  them  in administering  the 
discount  window.  In  the  past  the  Federal  Reserve 
has  provided  extended  credit  on  several  occasions 
to undercapitalized  institutions,  including  some  that 
may  have  been  insolvent  on  a  market-value  basis. 
This  practice  has evolved  from  the  System’s  “lender- 
of-last-resort”  responsibilities  and  has  reflected  its 
desire  to help  prevent  or at least  limit  the  disruption 
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availability  of  extended  credit  from  the  window, 
however,  may  facilitate  the  withdrawal  of uninsured 
funds  from  troubled  institutions  prior  to  resolution. 
If so,  it would  tend  to  undermine  reforms  such  as 
the  ABA’s proposal  since  one of the principal  benefits 
of these  proposals  would  be  the  increased  depositor 
discipline  it would  stimulate.  Therefore,  it may  be 
desirable  for  the  Federal  Reserve  to  reevaluate  its 
extended  credit  policies  in conjunction  with the  larger 
effort  to  improve  the  deposit  insurance  system.  In 
doing  so,  it should  be  kept  in mind  that  the  System 
can discharge  its lender-of-last-resort  duties  to a very 
substantial  extent  by supplying  liquidity  to the  bank- 
ing system  through  ordinary  open  market  operations. 
Strengthening Capital Positions 
Although  improving  resolution  procedures  is par- 
ticularly  urgent  in order  to  prevent  any  further  ero- 
sion  of  the  insurance  funds,  more  fundamental 
reforms  are also needed.  Among  the  most  important 
of these  is an additional  strengthening  of capital  posi- 
tions.  Considerable  progress  in. this  direction  has 
already  been  made  with  the  new  international  risk- 
based  capital  standards,  which  are  being  phased  in 
and  will be  completely  in place  by the  end  of  1992. 
Nonetheless,  a strong  argument  can be made  for even 
higher  capital  standards,  as Chairman  Greenspan  has 
indicated  quite  forcefully. 
Higher  capital  ratios  would  obviously  benefit  the 
deposit  insurance  system.  First,  they  would  enlarge 
the  buffer  protecting  the  insurance  funds.  Second, 
they  would  reduce  the  moral  hazard  in  the  system 
because  shareholders  would  have  a proportionately 
larger  interest  in an  institution  and  therefore  would 
impose  greater  discipline  on managers.  Beyond  these 
direct  benefits  to the  insurance  system,  higher  capital 
ratios  would  make  it  considerably  more  likely  that 
banks  would  be permitted  to engage  in a wider  range 
of activities.  This  is so because  the  additional  capital 
buffer  would  reduce  the  risk  that  the  safety  net  of 
which  deposit  insurance  is  a  part  would  be  ex- 
tended  implicitly  to  these  new  activities.  Smaller 
institutions  may  not  find  this  last  argument  of great 
interest,  but  many  observers  of the  U.S.  banking  in- 
dustry  believe  firmly  that  bank  powers  must  be  ex- 
tended  if American  banks  are to maintain  their  com- 
petitive  position  in  world  financial  markets. 
One  other  argument  for  increasing  bank  capital 
merits  special  attention.  In the  present  situation  with 
relatively  low  capital  ratios  in  many  banks  and,  in 
practice,  something  approaching  full coverage  of all 
depositors,  the  government  and  the  taxpayer  effec- 
tively  are  bearing  most  of  the  risk  associated  with 
the  depository  industry.  The  savings and loan debacle 
has  made  both  the  government  and  taxpayers 
keenly  aware  of the  nature  and full dimensions  of this 
risk.  Consequently,  it is likely  that  the  government 
will demand  increased  control  and  regulatory  author- 
ity over  banks  and  other  institutions  if it is asked  to 
continue  to bear  this risk.  Some  sharpening  of super- 
vision  and  regulation  is probably  needed  in view  of 
the  thrift  problem.  But  a  wholesale  increase  in 
regulatory  control  and  interference  would  not  serve 
the  interests  of either  banks  or their  customers.  The 
innovative  banking  activity that  has served  the  United 
States  so  well  in  the  past  would  be  stifled  and  the 
industry  would  wither.  This  is  obviously  a  strong 
argument  for  increasing  capital  ratios.  For  that 
matter,  it is a strong  argument  for  any  change  that 
increases  market  and  depositor  discipline. 
In short,  there  are several  solid arguments  for rais- 
ing capital standards,  and Chairman  Greenspan  stated 
in his  testimony  that  the  Federal  Reserve  currently 
is developing  more  specific  proposals  to accomplish 
this  as  smoothly  as  possible.  Many  bankers 
undoubtedly  would  like  to  know  where  they  are 
going  to  find  this  capital  and  how  much  it is going 
to cost.  Unfortunately,  there  is no  simple  answer  to 
this  question.  An  increased  demand  by the  banking 
industry  for  capital  would  almost  certainly  raise  its 
cost,  and  this  in turn  might  lead  to further  structural 
changes  and possibly  slower  growth  in the  industry. 
These  things  do not  sound  very  desirable  at first,  but 
this  kind  of  outcome  might  well  be  a  blessing  in 
disguise  if, as is very  likely,  it were  to  increase  the 
efficiency  and  therefore  the  viability  of the  banking 
industry  over  the  longer  haul.  In any event,  the  alter- 
native  of greater  regulatory  control  is almost  certainly 
worse. 
It  would  probably  be  acceptable,  in  this  regard, 
to  count  fully  subordinated  debt  along.with  equity 
capital  toward  fulfillment  of  required  capital 
minimums.  Most  independent  small  and  medium- 
sized  institutions  probably  will  find  it  less  costly, 
however,  to  attract  equity  capital  than  investment 
in  subordinated  debt  in  the  foreseeable  future. 
Other Measures 
It has been  emphasized  already  that  the  two  most 
effective,  practical  steps  that  can  be  taken  to  deal 
with  the  problems  in  the  deposit  insurance  system 
currently  are (1) improving  the  procedures  for resolv- 
ing  insolvencies  and  (2)  increasing  capital  ratios. 
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however,  that  would  complement  these  two primary 
reforms. 
Improved  supervision  clearly  would  be  one  such 
step.  One  of the  great  advantages  of higher  capital 
ratios  is that  they  would  reduce  the  pressure  for any 
marked  increases  in  regulation  and  supervision. 
Measured  changes  in  supervisory  activity  such  as 
annual  in-bank  examinations  of  all  insured  banks, 
however,  would  not  be  unduly  intrusive  and  would 
benefit  individual  institutions  as well  as  regulators. 
Another  potentially  helpful  action  might  be  to intro- 
duce  a  limited  form  of  risk-based  insurance 
premiums.  Such  premiums  would  link  the  price  of 
insurance  paid  by  a  particular  institution  (and, 
indirectly,  its  customers)  directly  to  the  potential 
burden  the  institution  is putting  on the  insurance  fund 
and  therefore  give  the  institution  an  incentive  to 
reduce  this  burden.  It  would  not  be  a  good  idea, 
however,  to  base  these  premiums  on  a  detailed 
categorization  of  assets  according  to  risk.  It  is 
exceedingly  difficult  as  a practical  matter  to  define 
and  rank  such  categories,  and  attempts  might  be 
made  to  manipulate  the  system  in  order  to  direct 
credit  to  favored  industries.  Consequently,  any 
differentiation  of  premiums  probably  should  be 
based  primarily  on  capital  adequacy. 
Whatever  other  reforms  may  be  made  in  the 
insurance  system,  some  people  will not  be  satisfied 
unless  action  is taken  to reduce  the  system’s  overall 
coverage  from  present  levels.  These  people  argue 
that  in practice  the  system  currently  covers  virtually 
100 percent  of deposits  and  a substantial  portion  of 
other  unsecured  liabilities.  They  argue  further  that 
this  situation  and  the  subsidization  of risk-taking  it 
entails  will inherently  produce  a continuing,  signifi- 
cant  misallocation  of  resources  and  make  the 
economy  correspondingly  less efficient-a  condition 
the  nation  can  ill afford  when  it is locked  in a global 
competitive  struggle  with the  highly efficient Japanese 
and  German  economies. 
This  rather  fundamental  economic  argument  for 
reducing  coverage  is very  persuasive.  The  question 
is:  how  should  it  be  accomplished?  The  ABA  pro- 
posal  discussed  above  is  one  possibility.  Another 
option,  of  course,  would  be  to  reduce  the  explicit 
insurance  limit  per  account  from  the  current 
$100,000  to  something  less.  One  does  not  have  to 
be  terribly  astute  to  realize  that  this  would  be  very 
difficult  to  achieve  politically.  It might  also  weaken 
the  competitive  position  of U.S.  banks  in  interna- 
tional  money  markets.  A better  approach  might  be 
to  enforce  the  $100,000  limit  more  effectively  by 
restricting  the  use  of multiple  accounts  by individual 
depositors.  This  could  be  done  in a straightforward 
way  using  social  security  numbers. 
Perhaps  the  most  productive  way to limit coverage, 
however,  would  be  to  introduce-or  at’least  study 
the  possibility  of  introducing-some  form  of  co- 
insurance  for  larger  insured  accounts.  Coinsurance 
probably  would  be  as effective  or nearly  as effective 
in  increasing  depositor  discipline  on  institutions  as 
a reduction  in the  insurance  limit.  It  also  would  be 
easier  to  sell politically  since  the  public  is now  well 
accustomed  to  deductibles  in  their  automobile  and 
health  insurance  plans.  The  public  might  well regard 
a system  likec this  as  a fair  and  reasonable  effort  to 
prevent  a recurrence  of the  savings  and loan problem. 
In considering  such  a system,  however,  it would  be 
important  to  analyze  carefully  the  implications  of 
coinsurance  for the  competitiveness  of U.S.  deposi- 
tory  institutions  in  world  markets. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
These  comments  and  observations  can  be  boiled 
down  to  two  main  points.  First,  prompt  and  mean- 
ingful  reform  of  the  deposit  insurance  system  is 
needed  both  to  correct  the  distortions  the  present 
system  has  introduced  into  the  economy  and,  more 
urgently,  to prevent  the  savings  and loan disease  from 
spreading  to  the  commercial  banking  industry. 
Second,  there  are  a  variety  of  feasible  options  for 
reform  available.  Accelerated  resolution  procedures 
and higher  capital ratios  are especially  important,  and, 
as  indicated  above,  a  number  of  other  beneficial 
changes  could  be  made  to supplement  and  reinforce 
these  fundamental  reforms.  Some  of these  changes 
may  require  some  adjustments,  both  in the  Federal 
Reserve  and  other  regulatory  agencies  and  in  the 
banking  industry.  If the  changes  are  made  carefully 
and diligently,  however,  American  banking  and finan- 
cial markets  will almost  certainly  be  much  stronger 
and  more  efficient  in  the  years  ahead. 
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